What greylisting actually does
When an unknown sender tries to deliver mail to a greylisted server, the server responds with a temporary rejection: a 451 "try again later" code. This is a standard part of the SMTP protocol. Legitimate mail servers respect it and retry within a few minutes. The mail arrives normally, just slightly later than usual.
Why bots don't retry
Registration bomb attacks are executed by scripts optimised for volume: submit to as many services as fast as possible. They are not designed to queue failed deliveries and retry minutes later. When a greylisted server rejects a delivery, the bot moves on. The confirmation email never arrives.
The numbers behind it
In real-world deployment, greylisting alone stops 80-90% of registration bomb traffic. Not because it's clever, but because it's simple. Most bulk attack infrastructure has no retry logic at all. The temporary rejection is all it takes.
The trade-off
The one downside is a short delay for first-time legitimate senders. The first email from a new contact arrives a few minutes later than usual. This happens only once. Once a sender's server has successfully retried, it's whitelisted and all future mail arrives immediately. For most organisations, a one-time five-minute delay is an entirely acceptable trade-off.
Greylisting as part of a layered defence
MX Moat uses greylisting as one of six protection layers. It runs first because it's the cheapest defence: it costs almost nothing computationally and eliminates most attack traffic before the more intensive checks need to run. ASN scoring, burst detection, and content analysis then handle whatever gets through.